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This consideration, coupled with the vice of inducing illegality,
makes the holding in the Robbin's case appear more extreme. Cer-
tainly the rule of thumb -that all trusts tending to induce violation
of the law are illegal should not be accepted without question by
the courts. If, however, a court is inclined to balance the equities as
the California court did, it is submitted that the individual facts
should be viewed in the context of the favored position of charitable
trusts in -the eyes of the law. With this in mind, it might take more
than care and support of a class of children to offset the resulting harm
to society in such a situation as the one presented in the Robbin's case.
In viewing the benefit bestowed on a part of society a court should
as well be mindful of the effects of its decision on the whole society and
its institutions.
TIMOTHY G. IRELAND
EFFECT OF INVALID MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
When a marriage is wholly void, it gives rise to no civil rights.1
It is subject to either direct or collateral attack2 by anyone3 at any
time 4 in any proceeding in which the existence of the marriage is mate-
rial.5 It is usually said that neither party to a void marriage acquires
any property rights by virtue of the marriage. 6
Although the mere fact of cohabitation may not give rise to any
property rights, the question of whether or not such a relationship nec-
'Succession of Barth, 178 La. 847, 152 So. 543 (1934); Hunt v. Hunt, 23 Okla.
490, 1o Pac. 541 (i9o9); Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp.; 173 Va. 425,
4 S.E.d 364 (1939).
-State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942). In re Karau's Estate, 26 Cal.
App. 2d 6o6, 8o P.2d xo8 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Jardine v. Jardine, 291 I1. App.
152, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937); Damron v. Danron, 301 Ky. 636, 192 S.W.2d 741 (1945);
Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944); Commonwealth ex
rel. Knode v. Knode, 149 Pa. Super. 563, 27 A.2d 536 (1942); Bray v. Landergren 161
Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252 (1934).
'State ex rel. Willys v. Chillingworth, 124 Fla. 274, 168 So. 249 (936); Jardine v.
Jardine, 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937).
'Pridgen v. Pridgen, 203 N.C. 533, 166 S.E. 591 (1932); Carter v. Green, 64
S.W.2d 1o69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
rKuehmsted v. Turnwall, io3 Fla. i18o, 138 So. 775 (1932); Succession of Barth,
178 La. 847, 152 So. 543 (1934)-
OFrey v. Frey, 59 F.2d 1o46 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Osoninach v. Watkins, 235 Ala.
564, 18o So. 577 (1938); Goff v. Goff, 52 Cal. App. 2d 223, 125 P.2d 848 (Dist. Ct. App.
1942); Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 Pac. 533 (192o); Toler v. Oakwood
Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4- S.E.2d (1939); Re Brencehley, 96 Wash. 233, 164
Pac. 913 (1917); In re Sloan, 5o Wash. 86, 96 Pac. 684 (1908).
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essarily bars claims to property acquired during its existence, is not so
easily answered.7 This problem was presented to the California Su-
preme Court in the case of Keene v. Keene.8 The approach taken by
the court should be viewed in the context of the community property
system since California adheres to this doctrine.9 However, the prob-
lem is similar in common law states.10
In the Keene case, a man and woman cohabited for approximately
seventeen years knowing that they were not legally married. The
plaintiff alleged that during -this time she and defendant owned and
operated certain ranch properties and other businesses as joint ven-
tures or partners. She further stated that she devoted her full time and
effort to the improvement and maintenance of these properties and
businesses. Plaintiff asked that she be adjudged the owner of an un-
divided one-half interest in proceeds obtained from the sale of such
property, the defendant being deemed to hold such interest in trust
for her benefit.
The trial court found that plaintiff had no interest in the funds
in question."
"In particular, the court found that 'plaintiff had no interest
in said ranch [in Butte County] at the time of said sale [in
1946] and that the same was the sole and separate property of
defendant ... defendant alone'; and that defendant 'did use the
proceeds of said sale to purchase certain other properties in the
State of California, but that the same were not purchased by
plaintiff and defendant as partners or joint ventures ... but the
same were purcihased by defendant as an individual dealing with
his own separate property .... ,-112
The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision
holding, in substance, that where a woman cohabits with a man know-
'Some of the problems encountered by courts seeking to answer this question
are discussed in Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953), and Vallera
v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
821 Cal. Rptr. 593, 371 P.2d 329 (1962).
OFor a discussion of the community property system see de Funiak, Principles of
Community Property (1943); Keezer, Marriage and Divorce, §§ 16, 236, 540 (3d ed.
Morland 1946); Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, § 46 (1931).
101n the common law system the question presented in the Keene case is much
more likely to arise in states which do not recognize common law marriages than in
states which do recognize such marriages. As a result, many of the leading cases
are from these states. The point is, that once a purported marriage has been found
to be invalid, the problems encountered by the courts seeking to settle property dis-
putes are similar regardless of the jurisdiction.
n'371 P.2d at 331.
u2lbid.
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ing they are not lawfully married, she is not entitled to an interest
in property acquired in the latter's name during the period of co-
habitation, even to the extent that she rendered services other than
as a housewife.'
3
A dissenting judge in the Supreme Court argued that the court
should have found an implied trust for plaintiff to the extent that her
services contributed to the property. The dissenting opinion points
out that one who furnishes consideration for the acquisition of prop-
erty is entitled to a corresponding interest in it. The dissent concluded
that the fact that plaintiff's alleged consideration consisted of services
as opposed to actual monetary contribution should not defeat the
existence of an implied trust.14
The majority rule seems to be that when a woman enters into a
marriage with an honest belief in its validity, she is entitled to a por-
tion of the property accumulated by the joint efforts of the parties
during their relationship.15 One of the leading authorities on this
point is the California case of Vallera v. Vallera'6 which was frequently
referred to in the majority opinion of Keene.
In Vallera v. Vallera, the California Supreme Court was confronted
with a fact situation similar to the one in the Keene case. The court
held that a woman .who cohabited with a man, without genuine belief
that she was legally married to him, could not acquire the rights of a
co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during their illicit rela-
tionship.1
7
It is important that two situations be distinguished: (i) where one
of the parties acts in a good faith belief that there is a valid marriage,
and (2) where both parties know the relationship is meretricious.
In the Vallera case, several possible approaches were discussed
hypothetically. However, the case seems to have actually been decided
on the basis of the putative marriage doctrine.' 8
131d. at 333.
'Id. at 339.
2Albae v. Harbin, 249 Ala. 201, 30 So. 2d 459 (1947); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich,
88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Vallera v. Vallera 21 Cal. 2d
68I, 134 P.2d 761 (1943); Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 8os (1942);
Titus v. Titus, 151 Kan. 156, 97 P.2d 113 (194o); Walker v. Walker, 33o Mich.
332, 47 N.V.2d 633 (1951); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746, 52 So. 2d 624
(1951); Conkling v. Conkling, 126 N.J. Eq. 142, 8 A.2d 298 (1936); Krauter v. Krauter,
79 Okla. 3o , 19o Pac. io88 (192o); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262
(1944); Philips v. Philips, io6 W. Va. io5 , 144 S.E. 875 (1928). For authority contra
see DeFrance v. Johnson, 26 Fed. 891 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); Schmitt v. Schneider.
19 Ga. 628, 35 S.E. 145 (1900).
1621 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
"7Ibid.
"Ibid.
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"The essential basis of a putative marriage, however, is a
belief in the existence of a valid marriage. In addition, in the
majority of cases, the defacto wife attempted to meet the re-
quisites of a valid marriage, and the marriage proved in-
valid only because of some essential fact of which she was un-
aware, such as the earlier undissolved marriage of one of the
parties....,19
In jurisdictions recognizing the putative marriage doctrine, the
property rights of a good faith party to an invalid marriage are de-
termined as though the marriage was in fact valid.20 In effect the in-
nocent party is given the standing of a lawful spouse before the court.
Although there is contrary authorty,21 some jurisdictions which do
not recognize the putative marriage doctrine will grant a woman re-
lief as to property acquired during cohabitation, if she believed in
good faith that a valid marriage existed.22 Several theories have been
advanced in support of the proposition that a good faith spouse has
an enforceable interest in property accumulated during an invalid
marriage.23
In the Mississippi case of Chrismond v. Chrismond24 where the
evidence showed that plaintiff married defendant in good faith, when
the latter was in fact incapable of contracting a legal marriage because
of a prior existing marriage, plaintiff was awarded a portion of the
parties' joint accumulations. Relief was granted under the broad power
inherent in a court of equity to prevent injustice. Likewise, in the
Washington case of Buckley v. Buckley25 recovery was allowed, the
court saying:
"Where a woman in good faith enters into a marriage con-
tract with a man ... and where in such a case the facts are as
they have been found here, where the woman helped to acquire
and very materially to save property, the court has jurisdiction,
as between the parties, to dispose of their property as it would
do... in a case of granting a divorce, awarding to the innocent,
"134 P.2d at 762.
"*Feig v. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218 Cal. 54, 21 P.2d 421 (1933);
Anderson v. Anderson, 7 Cal. 2d 265, 6o P.2d 290 (1936); Eaton v. Eaton, 125 S.W.2d
624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Cameron v. Cameron, 103 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937-)
'Schmitt v. Schneider, 1o9 Ga. 628, 35 S.E. 145 (1900).
"Fung Dia Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9 th Cir. 1928); Werner
v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 33 Pac. 127 (1898); Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 Pac.
241 (1885); Rakestraw v. City of Cincinnati, 69 Ohio App. 504, 44 N.E.2d 278 (1953);
See 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1942).
"31 A.L.R.2d 1255, 1260 (1953).
"'211 Miss. 746, 52 So. 2d 624 (1951).
25o Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1o79 (19o8).
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injured woman such portion of the property as, under all the cir-
cumstances, would be just and equitable."2 6
Some courts in granting relief to an 'innocent party to a void mar-
riage have likened the relationship of the parties to that of a partner-
ship.2 7 This theory was advanced in the Washington case of Knoll
v. Knoll.2 Both parties entered into the marriage in good faith. The
putative wife assisted defendant in the preparation of free lunches
which were served in the saloon of which he was a part owner. Further-
more, she worked as a seamstress in addition to performing the
normal household duties of a wife. Notwithstanding defendant's con-
tention that much of the money earned by plaintiff was spent for her
personal expenses, the court said that the property in dispute was
acquired by the joint efforts of the parties, and upon annulment of the
marriage should be divided equally between them as partners. Thus
the court treated the illicit relationship between the parties as a
partnership with reference to all property acquired by the "joint
efforts" of the paries.
A quasi-contract theory has been invoked in at least one case, as
a predicate for relief to an innocent spouse seeking an interest in prop-
erty accumulated during a purported marriage. Thus the federal court
in Fung Dai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong29 observed that even
though the plaintiff could not refer to any express contractual obliga-
tion within the strict legal definition, such a consideration was not
conclusive because she might be entitled to recovery based upon quasi-
contract for the services she rendered during the relationship with the
defendant.
Two other theories have been advanced by the courts in protecting
-"96 Pac. at io8i. Other cases have been decided in part, at least, on the ground
that a court of equity has inherent jurisdiction to grant relief where justice demands
it. Feig v. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218 Cal. 54, 21 P.2d 421 (1933);
Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 8oi (1942); Reese v. Reese, 132
Kan. 438, 295 Pac. 690 (1931); Walker v. Walker, 330 Mich. 332, 47 N.W.2d 633
(1951); Fowler v. Fowler, 97 N.H. 216, 84 A.2d 836 (1951).
=Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127 (1898); King v. Jackson, 196
Okla. 327, 164 P.2d 974 (1945); Whitney c. Whitney, 192 Okla. 174, 134 P.2d 537
(1942); Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 3o, 19
o 
Pac. 1o88 (1926); Knoll v. Knoll, 104
Wash. 1i o, 176 Pac. 22 (1918). In some instances the property acquired has been ap-
portioned on the theory that the purported spouses were tenants in common. Don-
nelly v. Donnelly, 198 Md. 3411, 84 A.2d (1951); Texido v. Merical, 132 Misc. 764, 230
N.YS. 605 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Lawrence v. Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (195o).
The partnership theory was adverted to in Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d
558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951) where recovery was allowed even though there was no
good faith belief in the validity of the marriage.
Zsio4 Wash. 11o, 176 Pac. 22 (1918).
227 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928).
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the rights of a putative spouse. However, they do not seem to be ap-
plied as frequently as those discussed above. One of these is the trust
theory. Property is said to be impressed with a trust in favor of the in-
nocent party, in order to protect his interests therein where legal title
is held in the name of another.30 Likewise, the doctrine of equitable
mortgages has been applied -to protect the interests of the innocent
spouse to an invalid marriage.31
Where both parties know that their relationship is meretricious,
a number of cases have taken the view that if the evidence establishes
an agreement to pool earnings, or a joint venture, or partnership, each
of the parties may have an interest in property jointly accumulated.3 2
The Washington case of Poole v. Schrichte33 presents a fact situa-
tion quite similar to that in Keene. Parties cohabiting meretriciously
acquired certain property through their joint efforts. However, here
the wife made monetary contributions toward its acquisition in ad-.
dition to rendering nonmarital services. Title to the dsiputed property
was taken in the man's name. The defendant subsequently sought to
exclude the wife from any interest in the property. There was no form-
al pooling arrangement or partnership. However, the court said:
"The evidence establishes here a joint venture if not a part-
nership between the parties so far as their interests in the tav-
ern are concerned. Their social relationships, legal or illegal,
moral or immoral, are not material on this phase of the case." 34
In Vallera v. Vallera, the court said that even in the absence of an
express agreement by a man and woman cohabiting meretriciously to
10Schwartz v. United States, 191 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1951); Titus v. Titus, 151 Kan.
824, 1o P.2d 872 (194o); Morin v. Kirkland, 226 Mass. 345, 115 N.E. 414 (1917);
Batty v. Greene, 206 Mass. 561, 92 N.E. 715 (1910).
"Conkling v. Conkling, 126 N.J. Eq. 142, 8 A.2d 298 (1936). Not included in the
discussion above are the California cases where the courts have analogized the situa-
tion to that tyhere community property is involved although, strictly speaking,
community property cannot exist without a valid marriage. California courts gen-
erally subscribe to the theory that where there is a good faith spouse to an in-
valid marriage, the property acquired during that relationship should be treated
as quasi-community property. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845
(1937); Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d 62, 89 P.-2d 164 (District Ct. App. 1939);
In re Foy's Estate, 1o9 Cal. App. 2d 329, 240 P.2d 685 (1952). However, most Cali-
fornia courts while adhering to this doctrine, prefer to go beyond this reasoning
and base recovery upon one of the theories discussed above.
aGarza v. Fernandez, 74 Ariz. 312. 248 P.2d 869 (1952); Mitchell v. Fish, 97
Ark 44, 134 S.W. 94o (1911); Garcia v. Venegas, 1o6 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d
89 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 217 N.W. 192 (1927);
Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1o44 (1951); See Muller v. Sobol, 227
App. Div. 884, 97 N.Y.S.2d 9o5 (1g5o).
339 Wash. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1o44 (1951).
3Id. at 1o49.
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pool their accumulations, the woman is entitled to share in property
jointly acquired in the proportion that her funds contributed toward
its acquisition.-' However, the court denied the plaintiff's claim
because she made no monetary contribution towards acquisition of
the disputed property, nor did she perform any nonmarital services.
An examination of the cases which have involved the possibility
of allowing recovery to a party to a meretricious relationship leads to
the conclusion that the courts prefer not to allow recovery in the ab-
sence of an express binding agreement. Going even further, in some
cases courts have refused to give effect to express agreements upon the
theory that any service rendered or monetary contributions made grew
out of an illicit relationship.3 6 It is said that courts cannot give effect
to such contracts or partnerships.
Perhaps the most important factor militating against the plaintiff's
recovery in Keene was the lack of a good faith belief in the existence of
a valid marriage. The court readily acknowledged that if the plaintiff
could have shown good faith, it would have been much more sympa-
thetic to her claim.37 The court discussed the partnership, quasi-con-
tract, and trust theories of recovery. However, the court's emphasis
upon the lack of an express agreement between the parties and the
fact that plaintiff made no monetary contribution to the joint efforts
of the parties makes it uncertain whether the majority felt that good
faith was a pre-requisite to any consideration of the plaintiff's claim
in the disputed property.
The majority opinion went to some length to rule out the existence
of a joint venture. The court said that without an express agreement,
no joint venture could be found, absent monetary contribution by the
plaintiff wife. In so holding, the court said it was following the Vallera
opinion which stated that such a plaintiff was entitled to share in
property jointly accumulated in the proportion that her funds con-
tributed toward the acquisition. The court refused to consider non-
marital services within the term "funds." 38 The term was used in
Vallera with specific reference to the Texas case of Hayworth v. Wil-
liams.3
9
TSee note 15 supra.
"Morales v. Velez, i8 F.2d 519 (ist Cir. 1927); Wellmaker v. Roberts, 213 Ga.
710, 101 S.E.2d 712 (1958). See Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835
(1948). (Court refused relief to one who had paid purchase price of land and had
title issued in the name of the other purported spouse.)
3'371 P.2d at 331, 336.
' Id. at 332.
'102 Tes. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909).
19631
